jakiro
Event background
October 23, 2pm UTC time, SHAR[1]It debuted with a dramatic performance, with its price soaring from the opening of $0.00056 to $0.05986, and its market value soaring to $60 million in just one hour, an increase of nearly 100 times.In the next few hours, the SHAR team[2]Negative news began to emerge, and some pushbacks accused him of alleging manipulating KOLs to attract investment.Due to negative public opinion, the price of SHAR fell to $0.02393 in the next three hours, with a market value falling to less than half of its high.But despite the negative news, many buyers believe this will not have a significant impact on the SHAR project, as some well-known KOLs continue to buy in large quantities at the low price points and are optimistic about the future of SHAR.From 6:00 to 8:00 on October 23, the price of the token gradually rebounded to $0.042.
October 23, UTC time at 9:26 pm, address CHj3[3]A transaction was initiated[4],Will500 millionSHAR tokens (about 50% of the total supply) are exchanged for19,619WSOL almost exhausted the liquidity pool.This operation caused the price of SHAR to plummet to $0.0013 in one minute, and the market value dropped to $3 million, and investors suffered a crash.
Fund flow analysis using MetaSleuth
Use MetaSleuth to clearly track the flow of funds in this incident, revealing some valuable clues.As early as two or three days before the market smash, that is, from October 20 to October 22, the implementer of this incident (control address CHj3[5]) 6045 SOLs were withdrawn from four exchanges in total.The four exchanges are Binance 2[6]2595 SOL, KuCoin[7]950 SOL, MEXC 1[8]580 SOL, OKX 1[9]1920 SOL.The extracted SOL is assigned to 14 addresses, all of which are controlled by the implementer of the smashing disk.
The implementers achieved two goals through these addresses: artificially raising the price of SHAR tokens and hoarding large quantities of SHAR tokens to prepare for the final smash.
Here is a graph of the capital flows from four exchanges to these 14 addresses:
At 2 pm UTC time on October 23, within two minutes after SHAR went online, these 14 addresses exchanged all SOLs it held into SHAR tokens.This move injects a lot of value into the liquidity pool and quickly pushes up the price of SHAR.Here are some of these 14 addresses for buying SHAR: Q81H[10],4Jxa[11],5q5n[12], 3xvB[13].In the next half hour, the implementer transferred all SHARs held in these 14 addresses to104It controls other addresses to further disperse these tokens.Below is a graph of the SHAR allocation funds for 4 of these 14 addresses.
This decentralized strategy makes it seem that no single address holds a large number of SHAR tokens from the on-chain data, thus reducing the outside world’s concerns about the security of SHAR assets.However, through an analysis of the flow of funds, it can be clearly found that although these large numbers of SHAR tokens are scattered to multiple addresses, they all end up beingThe same entity(implementer) control.The implementer retains the ability to sell all of these SHAR tokens at any time, thus being able to squeeze potential value from the liquidity pool, indicating significant security risks for SHAR tokens.This centralized control and decentralized disguise model not only exacerbates the opacity of the market, but also directly threatens the security of investors’ funds.
Finally, as the SHAR price rose, the implementers seized the opportunity to smash the market.At 9:25 pm UTC time on October 23, the implementer transferred and concentrated all SHAR tokens from the 104 addresses it controlled to the address CHj3[14].Just one minute later, address CHj3 initiated a transaction[15], sold a total of 500 million SHAR tokens at one time.The transaction almost exhausted the SOL reserves in the liquidity pool, and the implementer obtained 19,619 SOL tokens worth approximately 19,619 SOL tokens$4.2 million.At 9:26 pm on October 23, all users who still hold SHAR became victims of this market crash. The value of the SHAR they hold plummeted to one-tenth of the original value in just one minute..Below is a diagram of the capital flows in which some SHAR tokens are concentrated (from 104 addresses) at the address CHj3 and are then sold to the liquidity pool.
To track how the implementers cashed in 19,619 SOLs of illegal gains, we continue to track the flow of these funds.These 19,619 SOLs are in the address CHj3[16]The implementer has been retained for nearly a week until 4:21 pm UTC time on October 29, when the implementer initiated two transactions (ajqYwt[17]and 3uD6Ys[18]), transfer 6,000 SOLs to another address that it controls J7aV[19].In the next 20 minutes, the implementer passed two additional transactions (5STJND)[20]and 3z6C72[twenty one]), 6,000 SOLs were saved into OKX[twenty two]Exchange.Then at 7:52 pm UTC that day, another 5,000 SOLs were transferred[twenty three]Go to address J1wF[twenty four]and pass the deal at 7:53 pm[25]Go to OKX[26]Exchange.Between November 4 and November 10, the implementer gradually exchanged the remaining 8,600 SOLs in the address CHj3 for USDC and USDT.Here is a list of all swap transactions: 2rGGMf[27],5cWJte[28], 4AE6z7[29], 5HovYa[30], 4Da6zR[31], 5P9rmx[32], 5AAHn1[33], 5nm1Xy[34], Mn3Rxa[35].As of 8:30 am UTC time on November 14, 2023, the US$1.41 million USDC and US$168,000 USDT obtained by the implementer through redemption are still retained in address CHj3.In addition, about 19 SOLs are still retained in the CHj3 address and have not yet been redeemed.Below is a graph of all swap transactions (left) and deposited into OKX (right).
Key Addresses and Transactions
Disposal address:CHj3vHyMhF6DF3VkwhzgK833o7uvsN7CrPVyUdmbFo5E.
14 addresses that buy a large amount of SHAR at a low price controlled by the market smasher:
•E78TudQEcPwqiwnJ5HYEjJzogKPVAHGcLx7YRonxMuU3•5Cyg8Y4jEKKgna8Pf4xVXWLtNRZmJQksU23p1GyKnToU•EzHJnPZ83RKvXzGDZLtfgoEBWoVjLEetMHFos2XcES6g•5rXZD1pZjJqSLCNRSxhn3MQLvRQUQB5nDD1Gf8nNXjT3•5MMdwsfXXcZNpK95mHFTtYz8K7JQ3JcboRNAimH61suC•DZnhX2VG7LKLvfB747DgAmahGBdARevBfeTM4K1p1Rz7•BnCFNcGHh6pMZXgHUHJi4a82Vfo2Xtcw818b9FNMU49P•75fXUzEqjNeBtqhXzjAbVKa84AcfnvG59nMUnvb3SXUx•DEGdacTknp6BSYQc6fhJdfq9dZNZM3T4NBTSt8jnkygA•H6x6k37wSe7ZBUct4eHyHn6W1o2TTXfAy2z9WyvUNLpZ•Bhx3ZqViaRA4ZbXapro4VakYuS5bwhu2rc4cS8Dog1cy•RSaAciLFtxDVtBH3awdnrjrDmcGUQBjYTon2FPRpCJG•3UtiQzi1HGH7sEg28T1sZpeQPLAb4m6Hive2cW6CV9XR•86DrFintdQt5w7jyJjobFQ5hVU63rbneYnDfkqC9xAbL
passOKX1 (5VCwKtCXgCJ6kit5FybXjvriW3xELsFDhYrPSqtJNmcD)Make a cashed transaction:
•5STJNDbQBMbigzHf6mzCrtiM6s8QJjpQazzu5j7zC61uBB46V9NkumCw8UwWHXg7YxpomAFN664PnxHYMAU353q2•3z6C72fm6VVGdkFW3VcpjTccq725ZuVWpcZJv3GM3DBp3D3oLVjq2nyaRDhNZbmG95fi9cTTZfZ8bT22rdXjdEfR•64wMUp3VFz7pxZEpZak9uXAPfbEMBDiTWUGZLgECLn8fSMPexuR5ifRqJTSTpe98ELzRG676Pfe9xoXmG9DreiG1
Overview of the capital flow chart drawn by MetaSleuth
The 104 addresses controlled by the implementer for dispersing SHAR, obtaining SOL for smashing trading through four exchanges, and other detailed capital flow information can all be explored in MetaSleuth.
Explore more details now and discover valuable clues:https://metasleuth.io/result/solana/CHj3vHyMhF6DF3VkwhzgK833o7uvsN7CrPVyUdmbFo5E?source=5e4fca36-208b-4714-afb3-0800d5355323[36].
