jakiro
Written by: Tia, Techub News
Behind the solution to the MEV problem is the formulation of block space allocation rules, which is related to the Ethereum block production supply chain.exist”The current game between Ethereum consensus and MEV should start from PoW to PoS that day…In the article 》, we talked about some Ethereum proposals (PBS, ePBS, PEPC) before and after Merge. In this article, we will continue to introduce two other proposals – Execution Tickets and Execution Auction.
The importance of an underrated Ethereum proposal
The Ethereum Roadmap and Ethereum proposal both play a leading role in the development of the Ethereum ecosystem.It concerns the interests of each stakeholder.Today, Ethereum has become a public goods, and the governance of public goods should no longer be left only in the hands of the Ethereum Foundation and senior professionals, but should achieve decentralization.The determination of the direction of the rule is like Schrödinger’s cat. Once the route is determined, you can only see the results of the black box under this route.The Ethereum proposal and roadmap are related to the formulation of Ethereum rules and strategic direction, and decentralized governance is not just a matter of slogans.
Execution Tickets
At the protocol level, Execution Tickets sells the right to build blocks as tickets. If you want to build an execution payload, you must first purchase Execution Tickets to obtain the build rights. The specific building rights for the block are randomly selected.Here Execution Tickets is equivalent to an entry ticket for a block construction right.The right to build a block is only available through the purchase of Tickets without staking and becoming a validator.
Execution Tickets is estimated at approximately the opportunity cost of the originally proposed block of the proposer.Assume that the validator’s funding cost is 3% per year and the issuance reward is 2% per year.That’s the opportunity cost for the validator every year is 1%.Assuming Ethereum has 2,628,000 blocks a year and 890,000 validators, each validator has about 3 chances of being selected as a proposer every year.That is, the cost of becoming a proposer is about 0.33% of 32 ETH and 0.11 ETH.This is the approximate price of an Execution Tickets.The price of Ticket will be adjusted dynamically based on the quantity of circulation, and Ticket can also be resold to agreements to reduce the quantity of circulation.Unused Tickets can be circulated, but once the ticket is assigned to a certain location, it cannot be resold in the primary market and can only be circulated in the secondary market.How the fees for selling Tickets are allocated, yet to be determined, may be allocated to validators or may be destroyed to realize the vision of mev-burn.
Overall, Execution Tickets creates another market rule that is different from PBS. In PBS, a market rule is created that allows the proposer to select the block submitted in the builder according to the profit size, while in Execution Tickets, the proposer’s responsibilitiesCompared to PBS, the proposer is only responsible for proposing blocks built by selected Execution Ticketss holders with block construction rights.Validators will not be direct participants in MEV incentives.This will greatly reduce the motive of the proposer to participate in timing game.Because the proposer cannot get additional profits from the proposal.(But it might be different if IL is added).But as for block builders, since the block construction rights require the purchase of tickets and the price of tickets will fluctuate, the actual profit of MEV may be uncertain, so there may be certain risks.
Execution Auction
Unlike the randomly drawn ticket holders of Execution Tickets to obtain block construction rights, Execution Auction will auction the block construction rights of slots 32 slots in advance, and the highest-priced ones will obtain the block construction rights of the slot.The proposer is responsible for proposing the block. Attester witnesses the proposed blocks by the proposer and confirms whether the block content is built by the highest bidder.
In Execution Tickets, there may be a case where an execution proposer purchases multiple tickets to increase the likelihood of obtaining a build block.But Execution Auction is a single slot auction.
Execution Auction and Execution Tickets are both intended to ensure that the proposer responsibilities are simplified—propose the right to ultimately obtain the build rights.The advantage of Execution Auction is that it can implement precomfirm to some extent.From the perspective of implementation simplicity, Execution Auction will be better than Execution Tickets. The randomness issue that Execution Tickets needs to be considered is skipped here. From the perspective of mechanism implementation, Execution Auction is more feasible.If you want to compare the trade-offs of these two proposals, you can also look at the benefits of the agreement or from all stakeholders, which option may be better.
